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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
National-level  strategies  for  reducing  emissions  from  deforestation
and degradation  (REDD),  ﬁnanced  by international  transfers,  have
begun to  emerge.  A three-sector  model  is  developed  to  explore  the
economy-wide effects  of  two  policies  implemented  by  a  govern-
ment participating  in REDD  that  differ  in  how  they  bring  together
incentives and  beneﬁt  sharing:  an  incentive  payment  scheme
where these  are  intrinsically  linked  and  taxes  where  they  are  sep-
arated. Two  sectors  utilise  forest  as  an  input  to  production,  one  in
which forest  is  substitutable  for  labour,  producing  a carbon  exter-
nality, and  one  in which  forest  and  labour  are  complements  and
where forest  is used  sustainably.  Two  important  effects  determine
model outcomes.  First,  the  government  factors  in general  equilib-
rium effects  when  determining  the efﬁcient  payment  level.  This
implies that  the  level  of  international  transfers  is not  fully  passed
through to  the  forest-using  sectors.  Second,  even  though  the sus-
tainable sector  receives  no  incentive  payment  it can  increase  in
size through  the  effect  of  REDD  payments  on  markets.  With  polit-
ical inﬂuence,  where  incentives  and  beneﬁt  sharing  are  linked  the
forest-using sectors  may  lobby  for  lower  payment  rates  for  them-
selves in  order  to  create  a larger  international  transfer.  Where
there  is  a separation  between  incentives  and  beneﬁt-sharing  this
effect disappears.  The  ﬁndings  indicate  that  REDD  may  be less  cost-
effective than envisioned  at the  international  level.
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access article  under  the  CC  BY  license  (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 07780551902; fax: +44 020 7955 7412.
E-mail address: t.j.laing@lse.ac.uk (T. Laing).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2015.03.001
0928-7655/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
108 T. Laing, C. Palmer / Resource and Energy Economics 40 (2015) 107–126
1. Introduction
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in tropical countries could
address up to a ﬁfth of global, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Van der Werf et al., 2009).
Since Stern (2006), REDD has emerged as a potentially cost-effective strategy for reducing emissions, an
argument  based on comparing the marginal abatement costs of different mitigation strategies. Despite
on-going uncertainty regarding the design of an international REDD mechanism under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), national-level strategies and policy
frameworks are likely to play an important role (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen, 2009). Indeed,
countries are already developing strategies that include REDD. For example, Guyana has instituted its
Low  Carbon Development Strategy, and the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) is
involved  in developing similar strategies in a number of countries.
Through  such strategies, governments take on responsibility for attracting ﬁnance, designing and
implementing policies for achieving REDD, distributing beneﬁts, and setting baselines for emissions
reductions. Thus, they allow for the possibility of an economy-wide approach to REDD with a sin-
gle  baseline for emissions across all relevant, forest-using sectors.1 Yet in many tropical countries
these sectors are often characterised by weak governance and endemic rent seeking (Amacher, 2006;
Koyuncu and Yilmaz, 2008; Palmer, 2005). Introducing international REDD ﬁnance could potentially
redirect rent-seeking efforts towards the capture of any beneﬁts that REDD may  bring (see Myers,
2007).
In  this paper, we develop a model of a small open economy in order to examine the impacts of two
policy instruments implemented through a national REDD strategy: incentive payments (or payments
of  environmental services) along with input and output taxes.2 This serves to address the following
three questions. First, what are the economy-wide, general equilibrium effects of implementing REDD?
Second,  how might these affect government policies for achieving REDD? And third, how do these
effects change with political inﬂuence from sectors affected by REDD?
By shifting labour, capital and other inputs between sectors – via changes in relative prices – REDD
is  likely to have broad economic impacts. For example, REDD may  be used to encourage the growth
of  sectors that are less directly dependent on forest as an input to production. However, input and
output prices and the relative proﬁtability of all sectors may  also change. Recent research has begun
to  address these potential impacts. For example, Ibarraran and Boyd (2010) examined the multiplier
and distributional effects of REDD policies in Mexico using a computable general equilibrium model.
Opening the general equilibrium ‘black box’, Ollivier (2012) developed a growth model with land-
conversion dynamics in a two-sector economy and assessed the long-term impacts of an international
REDD transfer. Our model of a multi-sector economy also adopts a national REDD strategy ﬁnanced
by  an international transfer. Yet, we use it in order to examine how different policies might affect
different sectors, including their use of forest. In this respect, we  follow earlier work concerned with
the  impacts of policies on deforestation in a general equilibrium setting (e.g. Deacon, 1995), as well
as  research concerned with the general equilibrium effects of other, climate change-related policies
(e.g.  Rivers, 2013; Aronsson et al., 2010).
We depart from previous work on the general equilibrium effects of REDD by considering the
potential for political inﬂuence on REDD policy making. Speciﬁcally, we  adopt the common-agency
model of Grossman and Helpman (1994), who used it to investigate the impact of lobby group inﬂu-
ence  on trade policy. Subsequently, it has been applied to examine the role of political inﬂuence in
public  policy-making, including environmental taxes and subsidies (Fredriksson, 1997), environmen-
tal  protection (Schleich, 1997; Yu, 2005), and forest conservation (Eerola, 2004; Jussila, 2003). To our
knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to apply it to an international-level incentive like REDD. Previous
research illustrated how policies such as taxes shift the relative prices of inputs or outputs, returning
1 This could account for the release of carbon embodied in biomass even if it ‘leaked’ from one sector to another as a
consequence  of policy implementation (see Murray, 2009).
2 Policy options for REDD mirror those of forest conservation more generally (see, for example, Angelsen, 2008, 2009, 2010;
Daviet, 2009; Palmer, 2011; Pfaff et al., 2010). Incentive payments schemes have been central to REDD policy discussions in
recent years.
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revenue on a per-capita basis. By contrast, we  show how incentive payments shift the relative price
of  inputs, and provide a series of income transfers to different sectors. Indeed, the size of the shift in
relative  prices helps determine the level of income transfer.
These  income transfers can be potentially unequal, which suggests implications for beneﬁt sharing,
a  key concern of REDD policy design (see Costenbader, 2011). Two  discourses have been identiﬁed
(Luttrell et al., 2012). The ﬁrst concerns the effectiveness and efﬁciency of REDD, where beneﬁts are
used  as incentives to change the behaviour of actors engaged in deforestation. The second focuses on
equity  in which beneﬁts are used, for example, to reward forest users with legal rights or a history of
good  forest stewardship. Arguably, REDD has to be perceived as ‘fair’ by forest users and other REDD
stakeholders in order to provide legitimacy and support for policy. Different policies implemented by
a  government with a national-level REDD strategy may  have different implications for beneﬁt sharing.
Delacote et al. (2014) examine the distributional implications of incentive payments conditional on the
government’s  policy objectives. Our model, on the other hand, allows us to compare the implications
of a payment scheme that directly links incentives to income transfers, with those of taxes, which
offer a complete separation between incentives and income transfers.
Introduced in Section 2, our model adopts the consumer and producer formulation of Fredriksson
(1997) and incorporates three sectors similar to the framework of Jussila (2003). We  consider two
sectors that share in the beneﬁts from REDD, both of which use forest as an input to production. In the
ﬁrst,  ‘agriculture’, forest is substitutable with labour and use of the forest produces a carbon externality.
In  the second, ‘sustainable forest management’ (SFM), forest is used in joint production with labour,
and  there is no carbon externality. Similar to the models of, for example, Ferraro and Simpson (2002),
Groom and Palmer (2010), and Muller and Albers (2004), this sector represents non-extractive yet
productive use of forests, e.g. eco-tourism, sustainable forestry and biodiversity prospecting.3 We
depart  from those models by considering joint production in a general rather than partial equilibrium
setting. REDD is arguably likely to be as much about shifting forest to joint production activities as it
is  about using incentives to set aside forest.
An international incentive is offered to the government of the REDD host country as an exogenous
payment per unit of carbon externality reduced below a business-as-usual baseline. For example, by
the  FCPF or a country seeking to ﬁnance REDD via bilateral arrangements in the mould of those nego-
tiated  between Norway and respectively, Brazil, Guyana, and Indonesia.4 In order to reduce emissions
and  distribute beneﬁts, the government ﬁrst implements a payment scheme. As shown in Section 3,
the  government chooses the size of payment offered to each forest-using sector. As this choice deter-
mines  the scale of the reduction in deforestation it also determines the size of the total international
incentive received, or the ‘beneﬁt pie’, and the distribution of these beneﬁts between sectors. Increas-
ing  the payment to the agricultural sector strengthens its incentive to reduce forest use. This helps
create a larger beneﬁt pie, a larger share of which is distributed to that sector. By contrast, reducing
the payment has the opposite effect, reducing both the pie and the sector’s share.
We ﬁnd that the international incentive made to a government adopting a national REDD strategy
may  not be equivalent to the incentive transferred by that government to participating sectors. A
rational  government will factor in two categories of general equilibrium effects – forest price effects
that  result from the impacts of REDD policy on relative prices, and income transfer effects that result
from  transfers of REDD beneﬁts. Indeed, REDD may  be less cost-effective than originally envisaged by
Stern  (2006) onwards. We  also ﬁnd that payments to the agricultural sector drives growth of the SFM
sector  through its effect on factor input markets.
Political inﬂuence is introduced in Section 4. In previous work by, e.g. Fredriksson (1997), Jussila
(2003), ‘contributions’ are paid to an incumbent government seeking re-election. These contributions
are a valuation by the government of some element of the welfare change of one speciﬁc sector over
others in response to a policy change. This valuation may  be monetary or it may  be due to preferences
3 Such activities play an important role in small economies like Costa Rica.
4 Similar to many current REDD initiatives these are dependent on public funds. While some REDD projects are ﬁnanced from
the sale of Voluntary Emissions Reductions, carbon markets play a relatively small role compared to public ﬁnancing initiatives
(Peters-Stanley et al., 2013). Yet the development of regional carbon markets that accept credits from REDD, such as California’s
cap-and-trade system, could boost the future role of markets to ﬁnance REDD policy initiatives.
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for a particular sector, for example, due to interest group lobbying, the political make-up of the country
or  a perception that protection of a particular sector offers long-term beneﬁts to the country. In our
model,  giving contributions is conceived as having political inﬂuence, which can be offered by either
forest-using sector.
When  the agricultural sector has stronger political inﬂuence, the direction of change in incentives
to either sector is indeterminate and depends on the relative changes in the forest price and income
transfer effects. Which effect dominates depends on the dependence of the agricultural sector on the
forest  input, the relative ease of switching between sectors, and the deforestation baseline against
which the REDD payment is made. A similar indeterminate result is found when the SFM sector has
political  inﬂuence. This leads to the counter-intuitive result that under some conditions the SFM sector
may  lobby for a lower payment rate to its own sector in order to create a stronger incentive to reduce
forest use in the agricultural sector and boost the size of the international incentive.
In Section 5, we consider input and output taxes in addition to relaxing the assumption of per-
fect labour markets. Taxes are shown to inﬂuence factor and output prices as well as producers and
consumers. In contrast to the payment scheme, the international incentive is added to tax revenue
and redistributed on a per-capita basis thus separating the incentive from income transfers. Indeed,
there  can be a fully equitable distribution of beneﬁts. But when the agricultural sector has inﬂuence,
input tax rates are reduced. By contrast, taxes rise when the SFM sector has inﬂuence. Our results are
robust  to relaxing the assumption of perfect labour markets. Section 6 discusses the results before
concluding.
2.  Model set-up
2.1.  Production
The majority of countries likely to be recipients of REDD ﬁnance can be characterised as small,
open economies and thus, we set up our model in this way. There are three producing sectors, two  of
which  consist of local monopolies that utilise a forest input, f, in production. The ﬁrst of these sectors,
‘agriculture’ (ˇ), has two inputs, f, and labour, l, using a diminishing-returns-to-scale technology.5 In
utilising  land under forest cover, the sector produces carbon dioxide emissions from forest clearance.
It  represents a forest-extractive industry, which varies from place to place, for example, soya or cattle
ranching in Brazil, and palm oil in Indonesia.6
In the second forest-using sector (), ‘sustainable forest management’ (SFM), forest is an input,
again in combination with labour. This sector is characterised by joint production, i.e. labour and
forest are strict complements. Joint production can occur in non-extractive forest-using sectors such
as  ecotourism, biodiversity prospecting, and non-timber forest product extraction. Relatively undis-
turbed  forest ecosystems are employed as inputs, which, combined with labour, produce an output,
e.g.  tourist excursions, chemical compounds, or fruits. Thus, use of the forest in this sector does not
produce emissions of carbon dioxide, i.e. production occurs without forest clearance.
The third sector is termed industry (˛), which acts as a numéraire representing all other production
in the economy. It uses a single factor, labour, using constant returns to scale technology and has an
input–output coefﬁcient of one.
The three sectors produce goods x˛, xˇ and x with prices, pi∈˛,ˇ, exogenously determined on
the world market, with p˛ normalised to one. The economy is populated by N individuals, each of
whom has a single unit of labour, with N normalised to one. Individuals have a number of roles in this
model.  First, they can sell their labour endowment to one of the three sectors (’workers’). Second a
subset  of individuals owns forest, which they can lease either to the agriculture sector or to the SFM
5 This follows similar assumptions made by Eerola (2004).
6 We  note that these land uses may  have different environmental implications, although they are analogous for the purposes
of  our model.
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sector through a concessionaire system to local monopolies in return for a rent.7 Third a subset act
as  owners of the local monopolies in the agricultural and SFM sectors and they receive proﬁts from
these  sectors. Fourth, they consume goods from all three sectors (‘consumers’). Workers can sell their
labour  endowment to any sector. An assumed competitive labour market equilibrium implies wages
are  equated in all sectors at a level, w.8 We  discuss the implication of relaxing the assumption of
competitive labour markets in Section 5.
Similar to Ollivier (2012), it is assumed that barriers exist such that only those individuals with
existing forest resources can engage in the forest market. Barriers could be, for example, economic,
social, geographical or institutional. This assumption allows a focus on the effects of REDD in two
speciﬁc ways. First, on the potential of REDD to incentivise the agricultural sector to become less forest
intensive and second, in providing incentives to landowners to lease land to the SFM sector instead of
the  agricultural sector. It is assumed that this switch is costless. Our static model abstracts from the
dynamics of forest growth, although the switch from agriculture to SFM is likely to require time for
forest  to be rehabilitated. Thus, the cost of this switch may  exceed the cost of switching from SFM to
agriculture due to the time needed for forest regrowth. Yet, switching from SFM to agriculture will
also  involve other costs, e.g. for forest conversion.9 Imposing a constraint on the ability of landowners
to move from agriculture to SFM however does not materially alter the results; it merely reduces the
level  of some of the differentials thus reducing the scale of the general equilibrium effects.
Operators maximise proﬁts, and they can be aggregated together within sectors to give the
restricted proﬁt function i(pi, z) for each sector where z is the price of the forest input, f. Optimal
output y∗
i
is derived as the level of output that solves:
pi =
∂ci
∂yi
for i ∈ ˇ,  (1)
where ∂ci/∂yi is the partial differential of the cost function, ci(fi, li, z, w). Given optimal output, the
level of forest demand fi and labour demand li are the solutions to:
min  ci(fi, li, z, w) (2)
z is determined in a forest market and is the price that clears the market, based on the requirement
that:
f ∗ˇ + f ∗ = f ∗t (3)
where f ∗t is the total amount of forest in the economy.
10 This can be interpreted as the total, state-
owned area of forest where production is legally sanctioned, i.e. excluding protected areas, and where
production might be proﬁtable.
The determination of z clears all markets and deﬁnes optimal output, y∗
i
, realised forest input
demands, f ∗
i
, labour input demands, l∗
i
, forest input price, z and wages, w. These in turn determine
proﬁt levels in each sector.
7 Such a system implies that the local monopolies have concession rights once they enter into a rental contract with land
owners.  The agricultural sector could be conceived as any forest extractive industry that operates under this kind of conces-
sionaire system, e.g. mining.
8 It is assumed that there is a large enough supply of labour for x˛ to be produced in all cases.
9 The focus of this paper is on a REDD scheme concerned with the climate beneﬁts of forests. Yet, forests provide a much
wider  set of ecosystem services, which REDD initiatives increasingly consider. Moving from a pristine forest, to an agricultural
plantation, and back to a sustainably managed forest may  have important implications, in particular, for biodiversity. How
REDD deals with the potential for irreversible biodiversity losses has yet to be determined.
10 Our simplifying assumption of perfect forest markets is justiﬁed on the basis of our focus on the general equilibrium effects
of REDD, driven by changes in relative prices. The forest market also allows for the switching of forest use between sectors. This
enables us to determine the incentives to increase the use of forest in a more non-extractive rather than extractive manner.
112 T. Laing, C. Palmer / Resource and Energy Economics 40 (2015) 107–126
2.2. Consumption
Consumers, who are assumed to have identical preferences, consume all three goods and their
utility is an additive function of consumption of the goods, x˛, xˇ, x :
U = x˛ + xˇ + x (4)
where x˛ is the total consumption of the numéraire and xˇ, x is the total consumption of each pro-
duction good. Consumers are subject to a budget constraint and are assumed to use all their income
to  purchase the three goods. Thus:
Y = x˛ + p∗ˇ · xˇ + p∗ · x (5)
where p∗
ˇ
is the world market price for xˇ and p∗ is the world market price for x normalised by the
numéraire price, and Y is the income of the population as a whole.
From  Eqs. (4) and (5) an indirect utility function for the population, V, can be derived:
V = Y + u(dˇ(p∗ˇ)) − p∗ˇdˇ(p∗ˇ) + u(d (p∗ )) − p∗d (p∗ ) (6)
where dˇ(p∗ˇ) and d (p
∗
 ) are the realisations of the demand function for consumers at world market
prices p∗
ˇ
, p∗ and ui(d(p∗i )) is the resulting utility from that demand. The last four terms on the right-
hand side of (6) thus represent consumer surplus from consumption of the production goods. Given
exogenously determined prices, the values for consumer surplus are ﬁxed and utility is a direct function
of  income.11
2.3. Income
Income is generated from three sources, labour income, forest rents and proﬁts. The total income of
each  sector is the earnings from all individuals relating to that sector, the wages of workers employed,
the rents of landowners and the proﬁts of the local monopolies:
Yi = liw + zfi + i (7)
for i = ˛, ˇ,  , where li is the normalised labour demand in each sector.12
Social welfare, W, is given by the aggregate indirect utility of the population, which follows from
Eqs.  (6) and (7) as:
W = w + z(f ∗ˇ + f ∗ ) + ˇ +  + u(dˇ(p∗ˇ)) − p∗ˇdˇ(p∗ˇ) + u(d (p∗ )) − p∗d (p∗ ) (8)
We  assume that each unit of forest input used in agriculture, fˇ, creates one unit of carbon diox-
ide, and F∗ = f ∗
ˇ
is the baseline level of carbon dioxide emissions from deforestation, i.e. before the
implementation of REDD.
3.  Introducing REDD
A REDD strategy is implemented by the government of the economy (‘the government’). It is offered
an  incentive by an international actor at an exogenous rate, , per-unit of carbon dioxide. This rate is
either  set by a carbon market or by the international actor with the aim of reducing the generation of
carbon  dioxide from deforestation below the baseline level, F*, with  > 0 and payments of zero for:
f ∗
ˇ
> F∗.
11 This follows similar assumptions made by Fredriksson (1997).
12 Due to the assumption of constant-to-returns to scale technology in the industry sector ˛ is zero and is therefore excluded.
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3.1. Payment scheme
The  payment scheme consists of a ﬁnancial transfer to both the agricultural and SFM sectors with
the  total equal to the payment received by the government from the international actor. Note that
the  rest of the economy, represented by industry in our model, is excluded from the beneﬁts of REDD.
We  justify the inclusion of SFM due to its use of forest as an input to production. This also allows us
to  explore the implications of the government’s decision of how to split the pie, in particular should
it  decide to reduce the payment to the agriculture sector. Indeed, we ﬁnd similar results if instead
the government chose to retain REDD ﬁnance or distribute it to the industrial sector. A payment, , is
offered  to each sector, given by:
i = ϕi(F∗ − f ∗ˇ ), i ∈ ˇ,  (9)
with  =
∑
i=ˇ,ϕi and ϕi > 0. Thus, ϕi denotes the payment rate. It is assumed that payments accrue to
the local monopolies with incentives passed on the landowners through rents.13 While the SFM sector
does  not engage in deforestation and emits no carbon dioxide, this sector receives payments, the size
of  which is dependent on the extent of deforestation in the agricultural sector. The payment scheme
splits the entire ‘beneﬁt pie’ from the international incentive between the two sectors. Yet, the size of
this  pie is also dependent on the extent of deforestation in the agricultural sector.
The conceptual timing of the REDD scheme is as follows:
1.  The exogenously determined payment rate per unit of carbon dioxide emitted from deforestation
is communicated to the government.
2.  The government decides the rate of payment it will offer to the two forest-using sectors, and
communicates this to the sectors.
3.  The sectors decide their level of inputs and outputs and produce carbon dioxide emissions.
4.  The international actor provides the ﬁnance based on the exogenous rate and the realised quantity
of carbon dioxide from deforestation.
5.  The government passes through the payment to the sectors based on the rate communicated in
step 2.
In the agricultural sector, the payment scheme offers a share in the beneﬁts from REDD in two
ways, which correspond to the two discourses identiﬁed by Luttrell et al. (2012). First, there is an
income transfer equal to the agricultural sector’s payment rate multiplied by baseline forest use, F*
(‘equity’). Second, the agricultural sector faces an increase in the forest input price, which represents
the incentive to reduce (future) deforestation (‘efﬁciency, effectiveness’). Government-coordinated
payment schemes that combine incentives with income transfers are relatively common across the
world.  Such schemes often attempt to improve environmental outcomes while tackling rural poverty.
For  example, Ecuador’s Socio Bosque programme offers payment rates dependent on the size of the
area  put under conservation (de Koning et al., 2011). Thus, poorer landowners who  control smaller
areas are offered larger payments per ha than those with larger landholdings.
The SFM sector does not face incentives to reduce deforestation but receives an income transfer.
This is equal to the SFM sector’s payment rate multiplied by the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions
from deforestation in the agricultural sector. In our framework, the income transfer to the SFM sector
can  be interpreted as a reward for good forest stewardship and hence, plays no role in the sector’s
production decision. An example of such support can be seen in the Bolsa Floresta project in Brazil,
which was observed to beneﬁt 30,000 forest dwellers across 15 ‘Sustainable Development Reserves’
(Börner et al., 2013). Cash is transferred to families in exchange for promises to, e.g. send children to
school,  participate in local organisations, and undertake conservation activities.
The payment scheme has the effect of driving a wedge in forest input prices between the two
sectors, gross of the payment. It changes the relative prices of the forest input and redistributes the
13 If payments are offered to consumers of agricultural output after the production decision is made there will be no effect on
quantities of forest input.
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revenue in proportion to the change in relative prices. Through the market, forest prices net of payment
are  equalised at a new equilibrium.
The  introduction of the payment scheme amends the proﬁt function of the agricultural sector to:
′ˇ = ˇ[p∗ˇ, xˇ, z + ϕˇ, f ∗ˇ, w, lˇ] + ϕˇF∗ (10)
with the proﬁt function of the SFM sector becoming:
′ =  [p∗ , x , z, f ∗ , w, l ] + ϕ (F∗ − f ∗ˇ ) (11)
The inclusion of REDD payments also means that both the forest price, z, and the forest input level
in  agriculture, f ∗
ˇ
, become functions of ϕˇ, the payment rate to the agricultural sector. Intuitively, the
payment affects the returns from the use of forest in the agricultural sector, which affects the demand
schedules and in turn the equilibrium forest price. By increasing the forest price to the agricultural
sector gross of the payment it reduces the sector’s returns on forest. This leads to a lower demand for
the  factor, which implies a lower equilibrium forest price thus determining the optimal allocation of
forest  between the two sectors. The fall in agricultural proﬁts and forest prices results in landowners
leasing forest to the SFM sector instead of the agricultural sector.
Combining  (10) and (11) with (8) gives the amended social welfare function under REDD as:
W = w + zf ∗t + ′ˇ + ′ + u(dˇ(p∗ˇ)) − p∗ˇdˇ(p∗ˇ) + u(d (p∗ )) − p∗d (p∗ ) (12)
From (12) the government’s maximisation problem is thus:
max
ϕˇ,ϕ
W = w + zf ∗t + ′ˇ[p∗ˇ, w, z + ϕˇ, ˇ, f ∗ˇ, xˇ, ϕˇ] + ′ [p∗ , x , z, f ∗ , w, , ϕ, f ∗ˇ ] + CS (13)
subject to:
∑
i=ˇ,ϕi =  where the constant level of consumer surplus relating to the two production
goods is given by:14
CS = u(dˇ(p∗ˇ)) − p∗ˇdˇ(p∗ˇ) + u(d (p∗ )) − p∗d (p∗ )
We  solve the maximisation problem using the Lagrangian method with the maximisation given
from (13) as:
W = w + zf ∗t + ′ˇ[p∗ˇ, w, z + ϕˇ, ˇ, f ∗ˇ, xˇ, ϕˇ] + ′ [p∗ , x , z, f ∗ , w, , ϕ, f ∗ˇ ]
+ (ϕˇ + ϕ − ) (14)
Differentiating (14) gives the ﬁrst-order conditions of:
∂W
∂ϕˇ
= ∂w
∂ϕˇ
+ ∂z
∂ϕˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂ϕˇ
+ F∗ + ∂
∂ϕˇ
− ϕ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
+  (15)
∂W
∂ϕ
= (F∗ − f ∗ˇ ) +  (16)
∂W
∂
=  ϕˇ + ϕ −  (17)
These conditions are rearranged to give the following payment rates, made to each forest-using
sector:
ϕˇ =  −
⎛
⎜⎝ ∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
⎞
⎟⎠ (18)
14 In subsequent discussions of the model we drop CS from the welfare equation as it is a constant and hence, is not affected
by policy choices.
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ϕ = ∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
(19)
with the following constraints:
0 ≤ ϕˇ, ϕ ≤ 
The bracketed term in Eq. (18) represents the general equilibrium effects of the payment scheme.
Thus, the amount transferred to the agricultural sector is equal to the international transfer minus the
general  equilibrium effects resulting from the implementation of the scheme.
Given the distinction between the incentive and income transfer components of the payment
scheme, the general equilibrium effects can be identiﬁed as follows. First, a ‘forest price effect’
comprises the impact from the adjustment in the relative price of forest between the sectors:
∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
. This consists of the effect of this price change, moderated through the opti-
mal allocation of forest in the agricultural sector, on the proﬁtability of each sector, wage income and
forest  rents. An ‘income transfer effect’ is identiﬁed as the change in the scale of the income transfer
as  the payment rate changes:
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
.
The following assumptions are made regarding the direction of the relevant partial derivatives:
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
> 0, ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
< 0,
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
< 0, ∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
> 0, ∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
< 0.
With respect to the ﬁrst partial derivative, an increase in the agriculture sector’s demand for forest,
f ∗
ˇ
, will, ceteris paribus, increase proﬁts as it allows greater production with the proviso that the
increase in f ∗
ˇ
will also raise z. It is assumed that the ﬁrst of these effects always dominates but at
a  decreasing rate implying: ∂2ˇ/∂f ∗2ˇ < 0. An increase in f
∗
ˇ
, reduces proﬁts in the SFM sector (the
second partial derivative) as it both restricts the amount of forest available in that sector, reducing
production, and drives up the forest input price, z. With joint production technology, the scale of this
effect  is independent of the level of f ∗
ˇ
: ∂2/∂f ∗2ˇ = 0.
An  increase in the payment level to the agricultural sector reduces the level of forest input demand
in that sector (the third partial derivative) since it increases overall marginal costs, reducing the level of
optimal  output, y∗
ˇ
, as well as increasing the relative price of forest against labour. The latter encourages
substitution between the factors for any given level of output. It also encourages a switch away from
the  agricultural sector as it depresses proﬁts in that sector. These effects are constant with respect to
the  payment level: ∂2f ∗
ˇ
/∂ϕ2
ˇ
= 0.
Moving  to the ﬁnal partial derivative, an increase in forest demand in the agricultural sector leads
to  higher demand for labour in that sector. It also leads to less forest available for the SFM sector,
resulting in a reduction in demand for labour there. The effect on overall wage rates will depend on
the  scale of these two effects. Given our assumptions regarding diminishing returns to scale in the
agricultural sector and joint production in the SFM sector, the reduction in demand for labour in the
SFM  sector is likely to exceed the increase in labour demand in the agricultural sector thus implying
a  net negative effect on wages.
In sum, payments to the agricultural sector, and thus incentives to reduce forest use, will be greater
when: the dependence of the agricultural sector on forest is smaller; the responsiveness of the SFM
sector  to increases in forest use in agriculture is greater (either through restrictions on forest to that
sector, or through an increase in its price); forest use in agriculture is greater; and the impact of the
payment on reducing deforestation is smaller.15
15 Given our assumptions, an interior solution to the model is found as long as ϕ is bounded by 0 and . The ﬁrst term of
(19) is negative, the second and third are positive and the fourth and ﬁfth are negative, which along with the assumption of a
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4. Interest group inﬂuence
In  this section, either of the forest-using sectors can exert some inﬂuence on government decision
making above and beyond its level of overall social welfare. To examine the effect on payment rates
of  moving away from the social welfare maximising payment rate discussed in Section 3, we  follow
Fredriksson (1997) who in turn builds on the characterisation of a menu auction problem by Bernhein
and  Whinston (1986) and the solution to the political equilibrium identiﬁed by Grossman and Helpman
(1994).
We  ﬁrst assume that a lobby group can offer a certain amount of inﬂuence on government decision-
making. What is often termed ‘contributions’ in the literature we  characterise more generally as
‘political inﬂuence’. Inﬂuence may  originate from economic power, the organisation of industry groups,
or  the ability to offer payments or campaign contributions directly. The government welfare function,
G,  now becomes:
G = W + 	Ci∈ˇ, (20)
where W is the overall social welfare, Ci is the level of inﬂuence offered and 	 is the relative weight
put on inﬂuence and overall social welfare by the government. The term 	 denotes the degree of lobby
group  inﬂuence on government decision-making. It can represent the extent to which governments
make decisions for the good of their entire population versus the extent they are made to beneﬁt a
certain  subset of the population, i.e. those with political inﬂuence. If 	 = 0, then the model is solved in
the  same way as in Section 3. Ci is assumed to be a continuous, differentiable function on a policy vector,
E.  This vector is populated by all the different feasible levels of the payment rate to the agricultural
sector: ϕˇ. It thus represents all the possible policy options available to the government.
The model takes the following steps:
- The agricultural or SFM sector has access to, and can inﬂuence, government decision making.
- This inﬂuence is valued by the government along with overall social welfare.
-  The sector with this access offers the government a menu of levels of inﬂuence based on each level
of the policy vector E.
- The government then chooses from its menu, E, a desired realisation of the policy, given as e, and
receives the identiﬁed level of inﬂuence.
Following Fredriksson (1997), ({Ci}i∈ˇ, , [e]) is identiﬁed as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if
and only if four conditions hold: the level of inﬂuence must be feasible, i.e. non-negative and less than
total  income; the government sets the policy instrument at a level that maximises its own  welfare
given the inﬂuence schedule on offer; the policy instrument maximises the joint welfare of the lobby
group  and the government; and, there exists an ‘anchor’ level of inﬂuence – that is, a least-favoured
policy option in which inﬂuence is zero.
The model is then solved for the case when either sector attempts to inﬂuence government pol-
icy  making.16 Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Fredriksson (1997), inﬂuence is ‘locally
truthful’. This means that any change in welfare is reﬂected in a change in inﬂuence. Hence, if the
welfare of one sector increases, it increases their level of inﬂuence proportionately. The condition for
the  government’s maximisation of its welfare function (20) is derived as:
∇W + 	∇Wi = 0 (21)
payment with a lower-bound value of zero, gives an optimum solution if:
∣∣∣ ∂z∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∣∣∣>
∣∣∣∣∣ ∂w∂f ∗ˇ + ∂∂f ∗ˇ + f
∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
∣∣∣∣∣. Corner solutions
exist where payments to either the agricultural or SFM sector are zero. However, discussion of these solutions is excluded here:
since the entire ‘pie’ is offered to one sector or the other, they do not provide any interesting insights for REDD policy.
16 When both sectors offer contributions the model simpliﬁes to the case where only social welfare is considered since the
two sectors are valued equally.
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where Wi is the welfare of the sector exerting inﬂuence on the government.17 Condition (21) implies
that instead of the government imposing the policy instrument up to the point where the marginal
beneﬁt to society is zero, it imposes the policy up to the point where a weighted sum of change in
social  welfare and the inﬂuential sector’s change in welfare are zero.
A limitation of the Grossman and Helpman framework is that it requires, at any time, one sector not
to  be involved in lobbying activity. If all sectors lobby together the result is equivalent to an absence
of  lobbying activity. This is a limitation of the model since all sectors are likely to lobby at the same
time in many cases. To get around this, the government is assumed to value the sector which lobbies
most effectively thus disregarding the efforts of the less-effective sector altogether.
In the context of deforestation, the agricultural sector is likely to be the most inﬂuential lobby
group in most situations. The farm sector lobby is a crucial political inﬂuence in countries like Brazil
and  Indonesia – witness the recent lobbying in relation to the revision of the Amazon forest code
(Los Angeles Times, 2012). However, there are contexts in which the environmental or sustainable
forestry lobby group has signiﬁcant inﬂuence. Environmental NGOs have played a signiﬁcant role in
driving  the creation of protected areas in many countries such as Madagascar (Brockington et al.,
2008);  environmental and sustainable forest management issues have driven the policy agenda in
early  REDD movers such as Guyana. Thus, we also examine the case where the SFM sector is more
inﬂuential in order to derive the implications for REDD policy.
4.1.  Agricultural sector inﬂuence
When the agricultural sector exerts inﬂuence the government chooses a level of policy instrument
that solves:
∇W + 	∇Wˇ = 0 (22)
with the agricultural sector’s welfare becoming:
Wˇ = wlˇ + zf ∗ˇ + ˇ + ϕˇF∗ (23)
Differentiating (23) gives:
∂Wˇ
∂ϕˇ
= ∂w
∂ϕˇ
lˇ +
∂lˇ
∂ϕˇ
w + ∂z
∂ϕˇ
f ∗ˇ +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
z + ∂ˇ
∂ϕˇ
+ F∗ (24)
Combining (22) and (24) with (15)–(17) gives the following ﬁrst-order conditions:
∂w
∂ϕˇ
+ ∂z
∂ϕˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂ϕˇ
+ F∗ + ∂
∂ϕˇ
− ϕ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
+ 
+  	
(
∂w
∂ϕˇ
lˇ +
∂lˇ
∂ϕˇ
w + ∂z
∂ϕˇ
f ∗ˇ +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
z + ∂ˇ
∂ϕˇ
+ F∗
)
= 0 (25)
F∗ − f ∗ˇ +  = 0 (26)
ϕˇ + ϕ −  = 0 (27)
Combining (25)–(27) and rearranging yields the following:
ϕˇ =  −
⎛
⎜⎝ ∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	lˇ) +
∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
(f ∗t + 	f ∗ˇ ) +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	) + ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ 	
(
∂lˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
w + z
)
+
	F∗ + f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
⎞
⎟⎠
(28)
17 The welfare of the sector is assumed to consist of all the income accruing from that sector, whether rents to land-owners,
proﬁts  and REDD payments to the local monopolies and wages to workers.
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ϕ = ∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	lˇ) +
∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
(f ∗t + 	f ∗ˇ ) +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	) + ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ 	
(
∂lˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
w + z
)
+
	F∗ + f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
(29)
By comparing (18) and (28) and (19) and (29) it can be seen that the government factors in slightly
amended indirect effects of the payment scheme when determining the payment rate. Thus, the forest
price  and income transfer effects change when political inﬂuence is present. The impact on agricultural
proﬁt is given greater weight (as 	 > 0), thus reducing the payment to the agricultural sector, as does the
amount  of wages earned by labourers in the agricultural sector, and the rent received by landowners
leasing forest to the agricultural sector. A new term is included in the forest price effect, which relates to
how  labour demand in the agricultural sector changes in relation to an increase in forest input demand,
∂lˇ/∂f ∗ˇ , weighted by the wage rate and the relative weight of political inﬂuence. An additional term
is  included in the income transfer effect, 	F
∗
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
.
It  is assumed that ∂lˇ/∂f ∗ˇ is positive; holding other inputs equal an increase in forest demand will
lead to an expansion in output. This increases labour demand in the agricultural sector, although at
a  diminishing rate as forest demand increases. An increase in forest demand also raises the relative
price of forest vis-à-vis labour thus boosting labour demand further. This, in turn, increases the wages
in  the agricultural sector, leading to a movement of labour away from the other sectors in order to
equalise wages. The inclusion of this effect will increase the forest price effect, reducing the payment
level to the agricultural sector. By contrast, the additional term in the income transfer effect will tend
to  increase the payment to the agricultural sector. The net effect on deforestation therefore depends
on  whether the change in the forest price effect dominates the change in the income transfer effect,
or  vice versa.
If  the change in the forest price effect is greater than the change in the income transfer effect then
the  agricultural sector lobbies for lower payments. This dampens incentives to reduce deforestation
in that sector thus increasing forest input to production, f ∗
ˇ
. This in turn increases agricultural proﬁts,
∂ˇ/∂f ∗ˇ . These two effects will partially offset the lower payment made to the agricultural sector.
But if the change in the income transfer effect dominates the change in the forest price effect then
the  agricultural sector lobbies for higher payments. This increases incentives to reduce deforestation,
although it is partially offset by the changes to f ∗
ˇ
and ∂ˇ/∂f ∗ˇ .
4.2. SFM sector inﬂuence
The  same trade-off can also be seen when the SFM sector has inﬂuence. Following the same
methodology as before, we ﬁnd:
ϕˇ =  −
⎛
⎜⎝ (1 + 	l )
∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ (f ∗t + 	f ∗ ) ∂z∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	) +
∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
− 	(F
∗ − fˇ)
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
⎞
⎟⎠ (30)
ϕ =
(1 + 	l ) ∂w∂f ∗
ˇ
+ (f ∗t + 	f ∗ ) ∂z∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	) +
∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
− 	(F
∗ − fˇ)
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
(31)
Again, the government factors in the amended indirect effects of the payment scheme: compare
(18) and (30) to (19) and (31). Inﬂuence from the impact of a change in agricultural forest input
demand on agricultural proﬁts is reduced. The government also takes into account the impact of a
change  in forest input demand in the agricultural sector on the size of the SFM sector. The income
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transfer component is modiﬁed with the government now concerned about the level of the income
transfer to the SFM sector given by
	(F∗−f ∗
ˇ
)
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
.
Inﬂuence from the SFM sector reduces the importance of the impact of changes in the forest price
effect on agricultural proﬁts. This pushes up the level of the payment to agriculture in order to create a
greater  beneﬁts pie from international REDD ﬁnance. The inclusion of the labour demand effect works
in  the same direction. Yet, the extra focus on the income transfer component to the SFM sector also
pushes up the payment to SFM. This reduces the payment to agriculture and incentives to reduce
deforestation. Which effect dominates will help determine the direction of change in the payment to
either  sector.
Our  result leads to the unexpected conclusion that, under certain conditions, the SFM sector may
lobby for smaller payments to itself in order to increase the size of the beneﬁts pie even though this
implies that it obtains a smaller share of the pie. The trade-off faced by the SFM sector is whether to
use  its inﬂuence to increase or reduce its own payment. An increase reduces the incentive to lower
deforestation in the agricultural sector and hence, the size of the pie. A decrease strengthens the
incentive to lower deforestation thus increasing the size of the pie. The decision is therefore whether
to  lobby for a greater share of a smaller pie, or a smaller share of a larger pie.
5. Taxes and the labour market
5.1. Input and output taxes
We  examine two further policy instruments that a government could implement as part of a
national REDD strategy: input and output taxes. Both are lump sum, levied on, respectively, forest
use  and the produced good in the agricultural sector. Revenues from these taxes are recycled to the
whole  population on a per-capita basis. Thus, taxes in our model represent a fully equitable per-capita
form of beneﬁt sharing. In contrast to payments, there is a separation between incentives and income
transfers. Input taxes operate in a similar fashion to the payment scheme in that they drive a wedge
between forest input prices in the agricultural and SFM sectors. However, they differ in that they
provide equal per-capita revenues rather than the differentiated income transfers observed in the
payment scheme.
Applying input taxes shows that similar general equilibrium impacts are taken into account by
the  government when determining how much of the international incentive is passed through to
landowners.18 Since the government does not factor the income transfer component of the payment
scheme into its decisions, the payment scheme and the input tax are equivalent when there is no
political inﬂuence. This is due to our assumptions of homogenous consumers and a government that
only  optimises aggregate social welfare.
The output tax has effects similar to those of the other two  instruments. It increases with the
international incentive, scaled by the impact of output upon the forest input. The impact on proﬁts in
the  two sectors is taken into account, along with a term representing the impact on revenues from
the  output tax. The output tax shows a conceptual similarity to both the input tax and the payments
scheme. How much of the international incentive reaches landowners again depends on the size of
the  general equilibrium effects.
When we consider political inﬂuence on taxes we  see clear directions of change. The ambiguity
found with a payment scheme is absent as the income transfer effect is removed. Since taxes only work
on  forest prices, the inter-linked income transfer component observed when payments are made is
no  longer present.
18 This ﬁnding supports the discussion of the payments scheme as ‘input tax’ plus income transfers. Formal derivations of all
results presented in this section are available in Appendix 1.
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5.2. Labour market constraints
The  presence of perfect labour markets in our model is a strong assumption that is unlikely to hold
in  many of the jurisdictions in which REDD is, and might potentially be, implemented. When there is
no  political inﬂuence, relaxing this assumption has two main effects.19
First, when labour markets are perfectly rigid, workers are conﬁned to their individual labour
markets. Any changes in demand for labour are realised in terms of changes in wage rates rather than
in  movements of labour between sectors. Wages become differentiated among sectors. When there is
no  political inﬂuence, these differential wage effects are included alongside other general equilibrium
effects. The changes in wage rates in both forest-using sectors are factored in, weighted by the size of
the  workforce in each sector. Whether the inclusion of these wage rates increases or lowers incentive
levels depends on the relative balance of the change in wage rates in the two sectors. If the wage effect
is  stronger in the agricultural sector than in the SFM sector payment rates to the agricultural sector
will  fall, and vice versa.
The  second effect emanates from any changes in the scale of derivatives now that the labour input to
each  of the sectors is ﬁxed. Given the ﬁxed nature of the labour supply, the change in proﬁt levels, and
forest  use from a change in output levels, may  change. Forest use may  be more ‘sticky’ as landowners
are unable to hire more labour to substitute for forest. In this case, all the policy instruments will
tend to be set at a lower level, implying that less of the international incentive is passed on to the
agricultural sector.
6.  Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we developed a model in order to examine the general equilibrium effects of policies
implemented for REDD, and investigate how these might change when there is political inﬂuence.
Such effects help shape the distribution of the costs and beneﬁts of REDD between the two forest-using
sectors, agriculture and SFM, which represent an extractive and non-extractive sector, respectively.
If these effects are not factored into policy design, then the incentives to reduce extractive forest use
(and  the associated carbon externalities) could be different from those transferred at the international
level to the government.
An  efﬁcient REDD policy chosen by a social welfare maximising government is one which factors
in  general equilibrium effects – relating both to REDD’s impact on economic variables via changes in
relative  prices (the forest price effect) and from its role in distributing beneﬁts (the income transfer
effect). This, we ﬁnd, could raise the marginal cost of the policy. Hence, the full value of the inter-
national incentive may  not be fully passed through to the relevant sectors if the policies chosen and
implemented for REDD have negative economic consequences. Higher international payments would
be  required to meet an equivalent level of emissions reductions. Accounting for general equilibrium
effects therefore implies a move away from the marginal abatement cost concept commonly used to
understand and estimate the potential policy costs of REDD. The Stern Review (2006) was the ﬁrst
to  make a case for REDD’s cost-effectiveness based on this concept. Since then, various analyses have
been  published, which have come to similar conclusions (see Lubowski and Rose, 2013). Our results
imply  that once we consider the broader economic impacts of REDD, the overall costs of a given REDD
policy  are likely to rise.
Policies  implemented as part of a national-level REDD strategy are likely to have effects beyond
forest-extractive sectors such as certain types of agricultural production. They have the potential to
shift  landowners between types of forest use, between sectors, and even out of forest-using activities
altogether. These shifts are likely to induce changes in output and input prices that may  affect the wider
economy and either reinforce or weaken the effectiveness of the strategy. An important insight of the
model  is that even in the absence of incentives to the SFM sector, this sector could still be incentivised
to expand as a consequence of incentives made to the agricultural sector to reduce carbon dioxide
19 Formal derivation of the results from relaxing the labour market assumption is available in Appendix 2.
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emissions from deforestation. Forest shifting from agriculture into joint production results in climate
beneﬁts, which are not directly rewarded in our framework.
A  key initial assumption of our model is that the government chooses the socially welfare maximis-
ing payment rate. We  examine a scenario in which one or the other forest-using sector may  lobby the
government to move away from this rate and ﬁnd that general equilibrium effects remain important.
Application of the common-agency model to this type of policy instrument, which has the capacity
to  change relative prices and enact unequal income transfers, is shown to have ambiguous effects
irrespective of whether the agricultural or SFM sector has inﬂuence. In the former, forest price effects
lead  to the agricultural sector preferring lower payment levels. Income transfer effects work in the
opposite direction. The balance between the two  types of effect will depend on the scale of the emis-
sions  baseline used for REDD, and the degree of dependence on forest for production. Which effect
dominates in a given setting is thus an empirical question. For example, data on land uses, production,
and prices on inputs and outputs could be utilised in order to help determine the responsiveness of the
agricultural sector to changes in the price of forest land, along with the responsiveness of economic
factors such as wages and proﬁts to changes in the amount of forest input used in each sector. However
such  data regarding the substitutability of the different factors of production are often unavailable or
difﬁcult  to obtain. While national-level REDD strategies are still at an early stage, qualitative data on
the  political processes associated with REDD are being collected via projects such as CIFOR’s Global
Comparative Study on REDD+.20 Such data could provide benchmark data for estimates of the relative
inﬂuence of different sectors upon the political processes associated with REDD, which would allow
us  to calibrate some of the model parameters.
With an input or output tax, we see more clearly determined effects. Faced with higher forest or
agricultural output prices, an agricultural sector with political inﬂuence will use it to ensure that tax
rates  are reduced. When the SFM sector has inﬂuence, it ensures that taxes increase. This determinacy
is  due to tax incentives being set by the government independently of how it distributes REDD ﬁnance.
In  our model, tax revenues are assumed to be distributed on an equal per-capita basis, and could
include public good provision, such as investments in healthcare that may  offer broader development
beneﬁts.21 While an oversimpliﬁcation, the model illustrates how different policies can offer similar
incentives to reduce deforestation but differ in how the beneﬁts are shared. We  treat the incentive
properties of taxes and payments as analogous in our model as they impact relative prices in the same
way.  In reality, of course, these instruments have different properties, which could be explored and
incorporated in a future extension of our model.
Our results suggest that taxes have the potential to be both efﬁcient and equitable. In principle,
REDD funded through taxes on land use could be ﬁnancially self-sustaining. This suggests that at the
national  scale at least, there would be little need for international ﬁnance. While taxes have been
utilised to help ﬁnance national-scale PES schemes, they are often either general or on goods and
services, e.g. the fuel tax to fund the PSA in Costa Rica (Pagiola, 2008). Thus, they do not serve to
create the incentives to change land-use as conceptualised in our model. Yet, all that is required in
order  for governments to introduce a non-zero rate of taxation in our model is an incentive from the
international community, ﬁnancial or otherwise. The focus to date has been on securing ﬁnance for
domestic  REDD strategies and policies from international sources. However, this incentive could be
reputational, for example, associated with meeting international commitments such as those related
to  climate policy.
We  show that when incentives change the distribution of beneﬁts between sectors change. In other
words, moving towards more socially efﬁcient incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation
could change the distribution of REDD beneﬁts. Creating stronger incentives shifts beneﬁts from one
sector  to another even though the sector that gains fewer beneﬁts in relative terms could gain in abso-
lute  terms if the overall pie from REDD is increased. In such cases, increased efﬁciency would be traded
off  for less equity in beneﬁt sharing, although all parties would gain from implementing REDD. Indeed,
20 See http://www1.cifor.org/gcs/global-comparative-study-on-redd.html.
21 As long as the provision of public goods offers equal beneﬁts to all individuals and does not affect the production decision
such  provision has no impact on our model.
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REDD stakeholders could, depending on the scale of income and price effects, either lobby for lower
or  higher payments. Our results therefore suggest that payment schemes, which explicitly link incen-
tives  to income transfers, are likely to have those incentives distorted by lobbying behaviour. Should
payment schemes be designed with a separation between the incentive and income transfer compo-
nents then, as under taxes, lobbying would occur in certain directions. While lobbying in our model is
restricted  to the incentive to deforest, we note that lobbying by either sector might instead focus on
inﬂuencing other variables; for instance, lobbying the government to change baseline deforestation
levels in order to increase income transfers. Analogous to a BAU scenario, our baseline is simply set
at  the level of deforestation in the absence of REDD. Future work could examine the incentives for
different sectors to lobby national- and international-level actors to inﬂuence baseline setting.
The linking of incentives to beneﬁt sharing is plausible. Indeed, national-level incentive payment
schemes around the developing world often have multiple objectives, including environmental and
poverty  alleviation goals. We  acknowledge, however, that our model oversimpliﬁes the link between
the  goal to achieve efﬁcient and effective REDD, on one hand, and equitable REDD on the other. Also,
our  results derive from assumptions about how the beneﬁts from REDD are shared. Future theoretical
work could explore how sensitive our results are to changes in these assumptions.
The model developed in this paper is an attempt to address some of the real-world, policy design
and implementation issues that have surfaced in previous research undertaken on REDD. It is, how-
ever,  only a starting point for understanding the broader, economy-wide effects of implementing
REDD at the national level, and how political inﬂuence might change these. Our attention is focused
on  two stylised forest-using sectors, and the impacts that REDD policy may  have on driving inputs
and  production between them. The results are robust to the relaxation of perfect labour markets. But
the  assumption of perfect forest markets is more fundamental to our model. This assumption is unre-
alistic  when applied to the majority of REDD settings. A key extension to the model would be to relax
this  assumption, and incorporate a more realistic framework for allocating forest resources between
sectors. Another limitation is the model’s static framework. A dynamic extension of our framework
would enable us to model land-use transitions more appropriately as well as allowing for factors such
as  output prices and wages to be endogenously determined.
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Appendix  1. Derivation of results for input and output taxes
A.1.  Input taxes
Input  taxes, r, are levied on forest input so that:zˇ = z¯ + r
All  revenues are recycled on a per-capita basis.
Welfare becomes:
W = w + zf ∗t + ˇ +  + rf ∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )
Input taxes, r, are derived as:
r =  −
⎛
⎝ ∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
⎞
⎠
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We  assume:
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
<  0,
∂ˇ
∂r
< 0,
∂
∂r
> 0,
∂l
∂r
>  0,
∂lˇ
∂r
<  0,
∂2ˇ
∂r2
< 0,
∂w
∂r
<  0
Under agricultural inﬂuence welfare of the agricultural sector becomes:
Wˇ = wlˇ + zf ∗ˇ + ˇ + lˇ(rf ∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ ))
With the ﬁrst differential of:
∂Wˇ
∂r
= ∂w
∂r
lˇ +
∂lˇ
∂r
w  +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
z + ∂z
∂r
f ∗ˇ +
∂ˇ
∂r
+ ∂lˇ
∂r
(rf ∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )) + lˇ
(
f ∗ˇ + r
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
−
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r

)
The ﬁrst order condition is thus:
0 = ∂w
∂r
+ ∂z
∂r
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂r
+ ∂
∂r
+  f ∗ˇ +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
r −
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r

+ 	
(
∂w
∂r
lˇ +
∂lˇ
∂r
w  +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
z + ∂z
∂r
f ∗ˇ +
∂ˇ
∂r
+ ∂lˇ
∂r
(rf ∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )) + lˇ
(
f ∗ˇ + r
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
−
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r

))
Yielding an input tax of:
r =

(
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
(1 + 	lˇ) −
∂lˇ
∂r
	(F∗ − f ∗
ˇ
)
)
− ∂ˇ
∂r
(1 + 	) − ∂
∂r
− f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	lˇ)(
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
(1 + 	lˇ) + 	
∂lˇ
∂r
f ∗
ˇ
) −	
(
∂lˇ
∂r
w +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
z
)
− (1 + 	lˇ) ∂w∂r − (f ∗t + 	f ∗ˇ )
∂z
∂r(
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
(1 + 	lˇ) + 	
∂lˇ
∂r
f ∗
ˇ
)
(A7)
Under SFM inﬂuence welfare of the SFM sector is:
W = wl + zf ∗ +  + l (rf ∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ ))
Giving a ﬁrst differential of:
∂W
∂r
= ∂w
∂r
l +
∂l
∂r
w  +
∂f ∗
∂r
z + ∂z
∂r
f ∗ +
∂
∂r
+ ∂l
∂r
(rf ∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )) + l
(
f ∗ˇ + r
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
−
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r

)
This yields a ﬁrst order condition of:
0 = ∂w
∂r
+ ∂z
∂r
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂r
+ ∂
∂r
+  f ∗ˇ +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
r −
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r

+ 	
(
∂w
∂r
l +
∂l
∂r
w  +
∂f ∗
∂r
z + ∂z
∂r
f ∗ +
∂
∂r
+ ∂l
∂r
(rf ∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )) + l
(
f ∗ˇ + r
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
−
∂f ∗
ˇ
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
))
Yielding an input tax of:
r =

(
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
− 	 ∂l
∂r
(F∗ − f ∗
ˇ
) + 	l
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
)
− ∂ˇ
∂r
− ∂
∂r
(1 + 	) − f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	l ) − 	
(
∂l
∂r
w + ∂f
∗

∂r
z
)
− (1 + 	l ) ∂w∂r − (f ∗t + 	f ∗ )
∂z
∂r
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂r
(1 + 	l ) + 	 ∂∂r f ∗ˇ
A.2. Output tax
An  ad-valorem tax, t, is levied output so that:
pˇ = p∗ˇ + t
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with again revenues redistributed on a per-capita basis.
We  assume:
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂t
< 0,
∂ˇ
∂t
<  0,
∂
∂t
>  0,
∂y∗
ˇ
∂t
< 0,
∂l
∂t
> 0,
∂lˇ
∂t
< 0,
∂2ˇ
∂t2
< 0,
∂w
∂t
< 0
Total social welfare becomes:
W = w + zf ∗t + ˇ +  + ty∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )
Output taxes are derived as:
t = 
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂y∗
ˇ
− ∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
− ∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t −
∂ˇ
∂y∗
ˇ
− ∂
∂y∗
ˇ
−
y∗
ˇ
∂y∗
ˇ
∂t
Under agricultural inﬂuence agricultural sector welfare is:
Wˇ = wlˇ + zf ∗ˇ + ˇ + lˇ(ty∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ ))
This gives a ﬁrst differential of:
∂Wˇ
∂t
= ∂w
∂t
lˇ +
∂lˇ
∂t
w +
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂t
z  + ∂z
∂t
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∂t
+ ∂lˇ
∂t
(ty∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )) + lˇ
(
y∗ˇ + t
∂y∗
ˇ
∂t
−
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂t

)
This yields a ﬁrst order condition of:
0 = ∂w
∂t
+ ∂z
∂t
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
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+ ∂
∂t
+ y∗ˇ +
∂y∗
ˇ
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ˇ
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
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∂t
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w +
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ˇ
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∂t
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∂t
+ ∂lˇ
∂t
(ty∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )) + lˇ
(
y∗ˇ + t
∂y∗
ˇ
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−
∂f ∗
ˇ
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
))
The output tax is therefore:
t =

(
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂t
(1 + 	lˇ) −
∂lˇ
∂t
	(F∗ − f ∗
ˇ
)
)
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(1 + 	) − ∂
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− y∗
ˇ
(1 + 	lˇ) − 	
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ˇ
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z
)
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∂t
∂y∗
ˇ
∂t
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∂lˇ
∂t
	y∗
ˇ
Under SFM inﬂuence the welfare of the SFM sector is:
W = wl + zf ∗ +  + l (ty∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ ))
This gives a ﬁrst differential of:
∂W
∂t
= ∂w
∂t
l +
∂l
∂t
w +
∂f ∗
∂t
z  + ∂z
∂t
f ∗ +
∂
∂t
+ ∂l
∂t
(ty∗ˇ + (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )) + l
(
y∗ˇ + t
∂y∗
ˇ
∂t
−
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂t

)
The ﬁrst order condition is therefore:
0 = ∂w
∂t
+ ∂z
∂t
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂t
+ ∂
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+ y∗ˇ +
∂y∗
ˇ
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t −
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(
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The output tax is therefore:
t =

(
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂t
(1 + 	l ) − ∂l∂t 	(F∗ − f ∗ˇ )
)
− ∂ˇ
∂t
− ∂
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ˇ
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(
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∗

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z
)
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∂z
∂t
∂y∗
ˇ
∂t
(1 + 	l ) + ∂∂t 	y∗ˇ
Appendix 2. Derivation of results under labour market constraints
When  labour markets are perfectly sticky wages, w, in the three different sectors are not equalised
and thus overall social welfare includes the labour income from the three sectors.
W = w˛l˛ + wˇlˇ + wl + zf ∗t + ′ˇ + ′ + CS + (ϕˇ + ϕ − )
Following the same steps as for when labour markets are free the payment levels can be derived:
ϕˇ =  −
⎛
⎜⎝∂wˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
lˇ +
∂w
∂f ∗
ˇ
l + ∂z
∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
⎞
⎟⎠
ϕ = ∂wˇ∂f ∗
ˇ
lˇ + ∂w∂f ∗
ˇ
l + ∂z∂f ∗
ˇ
f ∗t +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+
f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
Under agricultural sector inﬂuence the welfare of the agricultural sector is amended to include the
differential wage rate, becoming:Wˇ = wˇlˇ + zf ∗ˇ + ˇ + ϕˇF∗
This gives a ﬁrst-order differential of:
∂Wˇ
∂ϕˇ
= ∂wˇ
∂ϕˇ
lˇ + ∂z∂ϕˇ f
∗
ˇ
+
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
z + ∂ˇ
∂ϕˇ
+ F∗
Yielding a payment rate of:ϕˇ =  −
(
∂wˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
lˇ(1 + 	) + ∂w∂f ∗
ˇ
l + ∂z∂f ∗
ˇ
(f ∗t + 	f ∗ˇ ) +
∂ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
(1 + 	) + ∂
∂f ∗
ˇ
+ 	z +
	F∗+f ∗
ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
)
Under SFM inﬂuence the welfare of the SFM sector is:
W = wl + zf ∗ +  + ϕ (F∗ − f ∗ˇ )
Following the same steps this gives the payment rate of:
ϕˇ =  −
⎛
⎝ (1+	l ) ∂w∂f ∗ˇ +(f ∗t +	f ∗ ) ∂z∂f ∗ˇ +
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ˇ
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ˇ
+
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ˇ
∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
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∂f ∗
ˇ
∂ϕˇ
⎞
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